Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the Personal and Institutional Aspects by Murauskaite, Egle
Peace and Conflict Studies
Volume 21 | Number 2 Article 4
11-1-2014
Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the
Personal and Institutional Aspects
Egle Murauskaite
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, emurauskaite@miis.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CAHSS
Journals at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Peace and
Conflict Studies by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
Recommended Citation
Murauskaite, Egle (2014) "Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the Personal and Institutional Aspects," Peace and Conflict
Studies: Vol. 21: No. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol21/iss2/4
Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the Personal and
Institutional Aspects
Abstract
Following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, the Arms Control and Regional Security
(ACRS) working group was launched as the first and so far only official regional arms control negotiations.
While there have been multiple attempts to distil the lessons of the ACRS process, the aspect of events most
conducive to forging trust between the negotiators and their inter-personal dynamics has never been
explored. This paper takes an inter-disciplinary approach to studying negotiations: it zooms in on the ACRS
process, integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes and nonproliferation literature with
negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more comprehensive methodology to
one of the highlights in the modern Middle Eastern diplomacy. To convey the multiple vantage points of
participants, a three-stage methodological process is discussed: individual interviews with negotiating team
members and facilitators, followed by group interviews of national delegations, and finally, a group session
with representatives from each delegation. Ultimately, this model helps preserve a more accurate historical
account, and significantly complements the technical insights on the negotiation dynamics with unexpected
inter-personal relations angles, assisting in the design of more promising future frameworks.
Author Bio(s)
Egle Murauskaite is Research Associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). She
specializes in trends of nuclear and dual-use technology transfers, with the focus on the Middle East and
South Asia. Her work appeared in the Global Policy Journal, Arms Control Today, Chicago Tribune, as well as
the website of Arms Control and Regional Security for the Middle East; she also presented her research at the
54th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), 26th Annual Conference of the
International Association for Conflict Management (IACM), 8th Pan European Conference of International
Relations, and the ISA ISSS-ISAC Joint Annual Conference. Prior to joining CNS, Murauskaite has been
working as a research assistant with Ambassador Fahmy at the American University in Cairo. In 2011, she also
taught a short course “Introduction to Politics and Negotiations” at Vilnius Satrija Youth Center. She holds an
MA (Summa Cum Laude) in International Security Studies from Sciences Po Paris, and a BA in Economics
from the Stockholm School of Economics in Riga. Contact: emurauskaite@miis.edu Tel. 202.842.3100, ext.
309
This article is available in Peace and Conflict Studies: http://nsuworks.nova.edu/pcs/vol21/iss2/4
Volume 21, Number 2 
135 
 
 
 
Studying Diplomatic Negotiations: Integrating the Personal and Institutional Aspects 
Egle Murauskaite 
 
Abstract 
Following the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991, the Arms Control and 
Regional Security (ACRS) working group was launched as the first and so far only official 
regional arms control negotiations. While there have been multiple attempts to distil the 
lessons of the ACRS process, the aspect of events most conducive to forging trust between 
the negotiators and their inter-personal dynamics has never been explored. This paper takes 
an inter-disciplinary approach to studying negotiations: it zooms in on the ACRS process, 
integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes and nonproliferation literature 
with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more 
comprehensive methodology to one of the highlights in the modern Middle Eastern 
diplomacy. To convey the multiple vantage points of participants, a three-stage 
methodological process is discussed: individual interviews with negotiating team members 
and facilitators, followed by group interviews of national delegations, and finally, a group 
session with representatives from each delegation. Ultimately, this model helps preserve a 
more accurate historical account, and significantly complements the technical insights on the 
negotiation dynamics with unexpected inter-personal relations angles, assisting in the design 
of more promising future frameworks. 
 
Introduction 
This paper presents a new methodological approach developed for a two-year oral 
history study of the Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS), a multilateral 
official negotiations track launched at the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. 
Much of the literature on conflict studies and negotiations in general, and the long years of 
the Middle East Peace Process in particular, has tended to readily accept negotiators as sterile 
representatives of national interests, with scarce attention to their personal traits or 
institutional background. Subsequently, this study focuses on personal perspectives of the 
ACRS participants, and the impact of inter-personal and inter-institutional dynamics on the 
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process. It draws on a diverse spectrum of practices of oral history, integrated with insights 
from studies of negotiation behavior, offering a new methodological contribution to help 
bridge the divide between different disciplines, and between theory and practice. The study 
complements the prevailing approach to exploring negotiation dynamics on the state level 
(which, in case of ACRS, is now relatively well understood) with additional levels of analysis 
on institutional decision-making and relevant personal aspects, painting a more 
comprehensive picture of these historic events. With no official record of the ACRS 
negotiations, and a new generation of arms control experts yet to emerge in the Middle East, 
the project, for which the methodology discussed in this paper was developed, will be able to 
offer guidance for setting up more successful future frameworks for negotiating Middle East 
security. 
The paper starts with a brief background on the ACRS process, introducing the 
methodological approach designed for this study. The second section reviews the practices in 
oral history that have laid the groundwork for this methodology. The third and fourth sections 
proceed to discuss the relevant theoretical frameworks in negotiation behavior and 
institutional decision making processes, which are subsequently tested for explanatory power 
for the ACRS case during the interviews with former negotiators. The fifth section follows 
with a brief discussion of the inherent limitations of the chosen research methods, and some 
of the remedies available to address them. The final section discusses preliminary findings 
from the interviews conducted to date. 
ACRS as a Case Study 
The Arms Control Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) has so far been the 
only official multilateral security dialogue and framework in the Middle East concerning 
WMD control and nonproliferation. ACRS was established as part of the Arab-Israeli 
multilateral peace process initiated at the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991. The 
ACRS group held six plenary sessions and many other conceptual and thematic meetings 
between 1992 and 1995. By 1995, complications in the Peace Process, the 1995 Review and 
Extension Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
and the ongoing disagreement between Israel and Egypt over when, where, and how to 
discuss the nuclear issue, all contributed to the ACRS talks being put on hold indefinitely 
(Landau, 2008). 
Nevertheless, ACRS achieved important understandings, including draft Declaration 
of Principles and Statements of Intent on Arms Control and Regional Security, draft charter 
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for regional security centers, as well as procedures for pre-notification of certain military 
activities and exchange of military information. At the same time the failure of ACRS also 
revealed the deep disagreements between Egypt (which took upon itself to represent the Arab 
position) and Israel on priorities, the sequencing of the Peace Process versus WMDFZ 
negotiations, threat perceptions, and the nuclear issue. The process also deepened mistrust 
and rivalries among various Arab states (Kane & Murauskaite, 2014). 
While much has been written about the ACRS process, its achievements, and reasons 
for its failure, not a single study has been written by those who negotiated the process. In fact, 
no account has ever been written of the decision making processes in the lead up to and 
during the negotiations, or the events most conducive to the negotiations, and most helpful in 
forging personal relationships and trust between the negotiators. Nevertheless, with consistent 
emphasis on confidence building measures in the literature analyzing ACRS content, the role 
of inter-personal dynamics, trust and good faith – or lack of thereof – held great potential 
significance. Yet, with no official record of these negotiations, memories of the participants, 
many of whom are already in their late seventies, are the last remaining trace of this 
significant chapter in the Middle East Peace Process. 
ACRS lends itself well to case study methodology, being a unique and significant 
component of the Middle East Peace Process, with a less abstract content focus, a clear start 
and finish date, and a relatively small and consistent group of people involved. These 
specifics make it knowable in a more comprehensive manner than other aspects of the 
process, or the Peace Process as a whole. Yet, many of the insights associated with 
personality impact and dynamics, are still externally generalizable and have value for similar 
future efforts in the region. 
This is the first attempt to gather the ACRS Working Group participants’ memories, 
commentaries, recollections, perspectives, interpretations, and accounts of events and 
experiences during the negotiations. The broad objectives behind this approach are to better 
understand what happened; offer rare insights into individuals and states’ decision-making 
processes; identify differences based on cultural values and perspectives; verify or explain 
contested events or decisions from multiple perspectives; transmit experiences to the future 
generation of negotiators and regional policy makers; and identify areas that require special 
care or consideration in future negotiations. 
In this study of regional conflict negotiations, an inter-disciplinary approach was 
adopted, integrating Middle East studies, decision making processes, and nonproliferation 
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literature with negotiations theory and oral history techniques, in the first attempt at a more 
comprehensive methodology to one of the most significant but least studied events in the 
modern Middle Eastern diplomatic history.  
The project was divided into three stages of interviews, complemented with personal 
notes of the participants, as well as archival materials of the period in question for canvassing 
a more accurate and comprehensive backdrop. In the first stage, members of the region’s 
negotiating teams and facilitators were interviewed individually about their personal 
experiences and roles during the negotiations, and the events that, often unwittingly, became 
the pivotal points. In preparation for this stage, each interviewee was asked to write a brief, 
mainly to be used to refresh the memories, as almost 20 years have passed since the discussed 
events. The second stage brought together small groups of individuals, who had served 
together on their state delegations, clarifying common and diverging interpretations as they 
become apparent, reflective of national inter-institution dynamics. The third stage unfolds as 
a joint session with one or two representatives from each delegation, where participants 
collectively revisit some of the key experiences identified in the previous stages, and get to 
compare notes across the national lines. This multi-layered methodological approach allows 
telling the story of a particular negotiating process from multiple vantage points – the 
individuals, their organizations, national delegations, and the process as a whole. The 
following sections detail the body of scholarship that this methodology was built around, 
explaining the aspects the model draws on, with the limitations of the chosen approach 
addressed in section five. 
Drawing on Oral History Practices in Conflict Studies 
Oral history as a methodology can bring to light hidden aspects of a past event, 
facilitating a sense of closure on issues not adequately remembered or dealt with. 
Methodologically, oral history practices have been successfully applied to studying arms 
control negotiations in cases of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, USA-UK 
1958 Mutual Defense Agreement, the negotiations between the USA, Canada, and Romania 
in the 1960s on nuclear energy cooperation, and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Blight, 2003; 
Daalder & Destler, 2000; Gheorghe, 2013; Haley, 2002). With efforts to revive the Middle 
East Peace Process in general, and regional arms control negotiations in particular, revisiting 
the ACRS story from this innovative angle can also assist in developing recommendations 
and offer insights to future negotiators. Indeed, identifying and clarifying common and 
diverging interpretations of events, and helping explain the thoughts and reasons behind 
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actions, is significant in moving forward, as many of these underlying realities remain 
painfully acute, and individuals in question still play a central role. In preparation for this 
project, the researchers consulted with three institutions that use oral history as part of their 
methodology. 
The USA Marine Corps (USMC) routinely uses oral history interviews to capture the 
personal narratives of active duty and reserve marines recently returned from overseas 
deployments, alongside the broader historical record of events that the Corps maintains. The 
Marine Corps History Division has an Oral History Program dedicated for this task in 
Quantico, VA, where officers are trained in this technique, and subsequently dispatched to 
conduct individual interviews with their fellow marines, using a standard manual. Each 
interview session is usually conducted on one-on-one basis and lasts from 45 minutes to an 
hour. Shared institutional background and relatable experiences between the interviewer and 
interviewee are conducive to quick development of rapport, and the interviewees tend to be 
forthcoming with information, assured it would not be shared with their superiors or used in a 
way that could adversely impact their stance (J. L. Rossiter, personal communication, May 1, 
2013). The interviewees consent for the recorded information to be used for the Marine Corps 
internally and it is rarely if ever released to the wider public verbatim, but the History 
division regularly uses these insights, anonymized and pooled, in its publications. 
These brief frank interactions in familiar surroundings, usually shortly after the events in 
question have occurred, represent one end of the spectrum – a routine emphasizing personal 
experiences in events, the significance of which is usually yet to transpire. Further down this 
spectrum are oral history practices employed to study events of historic importance that have 
occurred in the distant past, with the explicit purpose of preserving this record for the general 
public. Parts of taped interviews from several participants are usually combined to shed light 
on less known aspects of generally widely studied events. The Marine Corps Oral History 
Program, for instance, used this methodology to interview the veterans of Korean and 
Vietnam wars. 
Another step further down this spectrum of oral history practices are extended multi-
day interview sessions with one individual and a team of interviewers, used by historians to 
finesse details of somewhat controversial or less well-understood events that had occurred in 
the distant past. In preparation for the interview, a file is assembled based on publicly 
available documents, detailing the sequence of events in question (such as newspaper articles 
or relevant leadership statements) to provide somewhat objective and contextualized anchors 
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to the interview, and prompt the subject’s memory. For instance, scholars with the USA 
Institute for Defense Analysis have used this technique to individually interview Iraqi 
generals, who had served under Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, seeking their 
personal insights and the Iraqi military perspectives on the events of that period (Woods, 
Murray, Holaday, &  Elkhamri, 2009; Woods, Murray, Nathan, Sabara,  & Venegas, 2011). 
The team travelled to the Middle East to meet these veterans, usually spending around three 
days with each interviewee: the first day was used to build some personal rapport, moving 
through a series of increasingly detailed questions over the next day or day and a half, and 
using the remainder of the third day to rehash or clarify issues raised during these 
conversations. Kevin Woods (author interview, April 18, 2013, Washington, D.C.) described 
these intensive sessions as physically taxing to both, the interviewers and interviewees, 
requiring regular breaks to rekindle attention, and noted the challenges of communicating 
through an interpreter, as well as talking across cultural boundaries (USA-Iraq; civilian-
military; English-Arabic). The scholars have also noted that interviewees who were 
physically in different places at the time of the event in question (e.g. an air force pilot and a 
ground forces commander during the same battle), and thus had different but not directly 
conflicting narratives, were much more forthcoming with the information, compared to those 
who had lived through the experiences under scrutiny “shoulder to shoulder.” 
At the other end of the spectrum is critical oral history methodology. Namely, in 
mixed group interview sessions an inter-disciplinary group of scholars engages in a 
moderated discussion with a group of interviewees with diverse backgrounds, who had 
participated in an historical event, bringing different vantage points. The reference document 
package that the interviewers prepare includes declassified documents and more personalized 
records, such as letters, memos or transcripts from conversations, and the two groups interact 
over several days in a series of roundtables or seminars aimed at clarifying various aspects of 
the event. A representative example of employing critical oral history technique is a project 
exploring the roots of USA-Iranian enmity, where a group of international relations scholars 
and lead figures from the National Security Archive engaged with CIA veterans and former 
USA diplomats on the subject (Blight, Lang, Banai, Byrne, & Tirman, 2012). Another 
example is critical oral history series held at the Woodrow Wilson Center, such as an oral 
history of the Cuban Missiles Crisis and US-South Korea relations. In the latter, fifteen 
international relations scholars from the USA and the Republic of Korea (ROK), together 
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with former ROK and USA officials, explore the interactions with and within the Korean 
Peninsula during the Cold War (Ostermann & Person, 2011). 
Building on these practices, oral history methodology was optimized for interviewing 
international diplomats about their experiences during a past negotiation. Most interviewees 
were Western-educated and all of them spoke English (the ACRS negotiations were 
conducted in English). At the same time, whilst less constrained by language and cultural 
barriers, temporal constraints was a very real issue. Given the high positions of the 
interviewees (e.g. former prime minster or current foreign minister), they were able to spare 
no more than a few hours at a time, after rigorous planning. Scheduling individual sessions 
for 1.5-3 hours in length, and proceeding with group sessions of approximately half-day long, 
offered a balanced approach in this respect. The third stage of the project, a two-day 
conference based on the critical oral history model, was also designed to be shorter: with the 
first two stages of interviews laying substantive groundwork, it was intended as a narrative 
comparison session, instead of being the primary venue for raising the critical points. 
Another challenge in arranging the interviews proved to be logistics. Namely, best 
practices in oral history suggest meeting the interviewees in their familiar environment, as a 
gesture promoting openness and putting them at ease. However, with most Middle East 
delegates still based in the region, the tumultuous environment limited the number of 
locations conducive to interview meetings for security reasons. Similarly, factors pertaining 
to current regional dynamics also presented challenges in locating some of the former ACRS 
participants: with 48 delegates identified through literature review and personal consultations, 
it was possible to contact 20 individuals and schedule interviews with 15 of them, with more 
interviews expected to follow over the next 4 months. 
Prior to meeting for the initial individual sessions, the interviewees were briefed about 
the project, and asked to review any personal notes or documents they may have kept from 
the negotiations to rekindle the memory. Many interviewees have subsequently agreed to 
share this material, and that became a significant compliment to the background 
compendium, consisting of a detailed timetable of the process, source documents from the 
negotiations, available media reports from the period, and scholarly literature analyzing the 
process of negotiations retrospectively from the external observer point of view. For the study 
of the ACRS process, this proved particularly insightful, as these negotiations, from the very 
start, were conducted under the agreement that no official record would be kept. Furthermore, 
the author has filed requests under the USA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) with The 
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George Bush Presidential Library, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, and the USA 
Department of State, to make publicly available previously unreleased records of reports on 
consultations prior and following the meetings, phone conversations, as well as relevant 
notes, internal memos, reports and correspondence. Whilst the nature of these records is 
somewhat USA-centric, it offers important insights into the overall dynamics of a process 
that the USA was trying to facilitate, with particularly informative records of phone 
conversations between USA and Middle East leaders and diplomats. 
The proposed focus of the interviews on inter-personal experiences and inter-
organizational dynamics had initially surprised many of the ACRS delegates contacted for the 
project. As discussed above, the traditional approach to studying various aspects of the 
Middle East Peace Process had been primarily state-centric content-focused, with few 
personal anecdotes, occasionally found in the literature, recalled when emphasizing a point 
(Baker, 1995, pp. 454-455). Nonetheless, the former ACRS participants proved surprisingly 
frank in the interviews, eagerly sharing their personal perspectives on the interplays among 
the fellow negotiators on their team, as well as with their regional counterparts. The aspect of 
inter-personal dynamics proved particularly significant, since the composition of national 
teams has changed little during more than four years of the negotiating process, and the small 
community of international arms control experts meant they have been interacting repeatedly 
in this, as well as other forums. 
Incorporating Aspects of Negotiation Behavior Studies 
A common method for social scientists to test theories and models of interpersonal 
conflict negotiations is through behavioral laboratory experiments with volunteers, usually 
simulating situations relevant to business relations. To the best of the author’s knowledge, 
none of the previous studies using oral history interviews have attempted to integrate such 
insights into their methodology through question design or interview analysis. Druckman’s 
(1973, 1983) research offers a rare example of sociology and behavioral research models 
applied to analyze international post-conflict negotiations. Subsequently, this study looks to 
bridge the gap between disciplinary methodological practices, using quantitatively tested lab 
models as prompts in a qualitative study with first-hand participants of historical events. 
Studies of trust in negotiations are particularly relevant: introducing regional parties to each 
other through various semi-formal (Track 1.5) and informal (Track 2) initiatives, and 
bringing the discourse from abstract concepts to inter-personal interactions among 
counterparts, have long formed the facilitation backdrop for the Middle East Peace Process, 
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with success depending in no small part on the compatibility of personalities at the table. On 
inter-state level of analysis, confidence building measures have become an integral part of the 
process – but ultimately, these measures also start with a network of persons, who have 
confidence in their professional counterparts, and only gradually can that trust be embedded 
in the states they represent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, relevant frameworks for understand the atmosphere at the outset of the 
negotiations are reviewed by Lewicki, Tomlinson and Gillespie (2006), suggesting that 
parties start with surprisingly high levels of trust, absent prior information that would 
encourage them to act otherwise, and gradually move towards higher levels of trust and/or 
distrust, depending on their experience in repeated interactions. Meanwhile, in conflict 
studies, the implicit assumption is that parties arrive at a negotiating table with mutual 
feelings of animosity, i.e. that the violent conflict, ongoing or suspended for the duration of 
these negotiations, would act as such prior information, negatively predisposing the parties 
towards each other personally. In light of the violent conflicts in the Middle East preceding 
the ACRS negotiations, and the sensitivity of the subject of weapons of mass destruction, the 
interviewees were prompted to recall any prior interactions they had with their counterparts, 
the first impressions, and the initial atmosphere at the working group, looking for cues about 
whether and how those aspects shifted during the nearly five years of repeated encounters. 
Irmer and Druckman (2009) have put Lewicki’s model of trust development to a test, using 
quantitative methods to code textual inferences drawn from literature describing negotiations 
processes. The qualitative approach to integrating conflict studies and sociology literature in 
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this study complements the abovementioned research with first-hand accounts of participants 
collected through semi-structured interviews. 
Secondly, for understanding drivers of progress in negotiations, sociological studies 
of conflict transformation are helpful in thinking about the points of inflection, moving the 
process forward or stalling it instead. Based on Linda L. Putnam’s research review (2004, 
pp. 277-278, 283), the process of negotiation can be transformed along two dimensions: first, 
the level of abstraction may shift, in terms of the content of the talks, and second, the depth 
and quality of the personal bond between the negotiators may change (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it is important to appreciate that the impact of these inflection points, 
signifying change in the inter-personal relations or content focus of a negotiation, can often 
only be understood as productive or counterproductive in retrospect. Frank J. Barett (2004, p. 
214) and Irving Seidman (2013, pp. 17-19) have also acknowledged the skepticism of many 
in the field with regards to the ability of negotiators to recognize a critical moment as it 
occurs – rather than retrospectively. These insights have prompted the search in this study for 
the multitude of critical events throughout the ACRS process that could suggest attempts at 
such process transformations, and also to prompt the interviewees directly as to whether 
certain insights had occurred to them in real time or transpired in retrospect, consulting the 
participants’ own notes from the period in question when available. 
Thirdly, it is important to consider the impact of cultural differences on inter-personal 
dynamics. It has been suggested that negotiators from diverse cultural backgrounds likely 
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come to the table attaching differing levels of significance to verbal agreements (Friedman, 
Yi-Hong, & Simons, 2013), and varying levels of propensity to search for win-win (as 
opposed to winner-take-all) solutions (Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Brett, Tinsley, & Weingart, 
2012), potentially leading to miscommunications and overall sub-optimal results of 
interaction. Behavioral studies of negotiation dynamics in business settings have also 
explored the persistence and impact of cultural stereotyping (Tinsley, Turan, Weingart, & 
Dillon-Merrill, 2012, pp. 272-274), and it is worth seeing how these aspects play out in 
diplomatic negotiations. Cofman-Wittes (2005) has studied the interplay of cultural factors in 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but broader regional research in this domain remains scarce. 
In case of ACRS, whilst parties from the Middle East would have been abreast of the 
neighbourhood cultural and political dynamics, their limited official diplomatic interactions 
may have given them little indication of how these factors play out in practice at the 
negotiating table; for Western diplomats the reverse may have been the case – more direct 
bilateral interactions with the parties, but less practical comprehension of regional realities on 
the ground. Subsequently, the former ACRS negotiators were prompted to recall the general 
level of cultural awareness amongst their colleagues and counterparts, as well as previous 
experiences they may have had of cross-cultural negotiations. 
It is also worth noting that few contemporary behavioral studies of negotiations 
include individuals from the Middle East in their samples, with the contrasts between Asian 
and North American styles of negotiation as the more common research focus. Therefore, the 
insights of former ACRS participants from places like Israel, Egypt, and Jordan may offer 
new perspectives to the ongoing studies and future negotiations in this field. 
Inter-Agency Decision-Making Dynamics in Arms Control 
Studies exploring state decisions to acquire or renounce weapons of mass destruction 
frequently turn to the bureaucratic politics framework as part of the explanation, but similar 
approach has so far not been applied to studying the ACRS process. The institutional factor is 
important to consider, first, as a formative background influencer of the negotiators, and 
second, as a systemic indicator of the different bureaucratic arrangements for handling these 
arms control negotiations in participating states. Relevant models detailing organizational 
behavior are drawn upon in an effort to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the 
ACRS negotiations. 
The literature detailing decision-making and influence over nuclear weapons issues 
considers three institutional categories of particular relevance: the national nuclear energy 
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establishment, significant units in the military, and the political apparatus (Sagan, 1996-
1997). For the study of ACRS negotiations, the first category is expanded to include technical 
experts from a broader range of relevant backgrounds (e.g. missile or other WMD programs), 
and the third category is further divided into country leaders, foreign affairs experts, and 
(lower level) civil servants. The inter-institutional dynamics came into play by socializing the 
relevant groups of experts and influencers in the discourse of arms control through 
educational seminars, dialogue, and identifying the agreed confidence building measures. In 
addition, inclusion of persons with military background into some of the negotiating teams 
created potential for civil-military institutional background clashes. 
In his seminal work on institutional decision-making, Graham Allison (1971, pp. 67-
96) postulates that organizations follow a fixed set of actions to perform complex tasks, with 
their own survival and advancement as the top priority, and are subsequently able to produce 
only a limited range of responses to any given problem – inbuilt biases not always 
immediately obvious to outsiders. James J. Walsh (2000) has found institutional factors to be 
the most significant in explaining nuclear nonproliferation decisions, after testing a range of 
alternatives pertinent to security and normative environment: modifying Allison’s classical 
theory slightly, Walsh nevertheless underlines the importance of identifying the institution 
that stands to gain from such a significant national policy change. However, it is not clear 
whether, to set the disarmament talks (and process) in motion, the factors that have initially 
driven certain institutions to become proponents of pursuing WMDs would have to be 
reversed, e.g., as was the case in South Africa, or whether a rival institution would have to 
emerge with goals inconsistent with such a pursuit and challenge that incumbent, as was the 
case in Brazil and Argentina (for an overview of explanations of nuclear reversals, see 
Mueller & Schmidt, 2010; Paul, 2000). Subsequently, during the interview process, the 
author attempted to distinguish institutional level drivers of the ACRS talks, and identify 
evolving institutional approaches to ACRS, in light of their traditional operating dynamics.  
National government profile has also been considered among the leading explanations 
of state propensity to pursue weapons of mass destruction or disarm (if one presumes the 
reversal of the original drivers would allow the space for starting a dialogue on disarmament) 
– with assessed characteristics being the relative depth of democratic institutional culture, and 
international political and economic integration (Hymans, 2012; Solingen, 2012). These 
factors significantly affect the audience costs, domestic and/or international, that the 
leadership would incur in making such decisions. Regional security negotiations concerning 
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the most strategic armaments arguably had the potential to start generating audience costs on 
institutional level (for instance, consider Saddam Hussein’s misleading behavior regarding 
Iraq’s WMD capabilities leading to the 2003 war). In addition, existing and developing 
contacts between corresponding agencies of negotiating states would affect the ease with 
which international influence could be exerted over domestic bureaucratic apparatus. 
Furthermore, greater national inter-agency coordination necessitated by the ACRS process 
around the specific set of issues at hand could potentially extend the range of such external 
influence of any institution by effectively transmitting it over a newly formed domestic web 
of relations, rather than being limited to a single nod of the corresponding agency. These 
factors form an illustrative background for understanding the dynamics within national 
ACRS delegations, explored during the second stage of interviews in this project. 
Leadership susceptibility to public opinion pressure has often added complications to 
the Middle East Peace Process talks, but as the ACRS talks unfolded in a separate, more 
isolated domain, with negotiators several levels removed from the highly visible top 
leadership, an interesting insight to consider is whether this increased the relative significance 
of the institutional level traits (over personal or state level). Although country leaders still 
were the ones to make the final decisions in ACRS, their involvement in the negotiating 
process was rather limited (in contrast to the talks during the Peace Process), having 
instructed their national negotiators in broad terms. The technical nature of discussions would 
have also made it accessible to a much smaller public audience, especially given that many of 
the negotiators had to be themselves gradually educated on the matter, potentially creating 
more leeway by further reducing public pressure. 
Another important factor to consider is the civil-military institutional dynamics. For 
instance, Israel’s tradition of particularly close civil-military bureaucracies in a democratic 
setting would have posed a curious challenge to the Arab state representatives, where a strong 
military establishment did not typically coexist with an effective and powerful civilian 
political structure - the nature of their previous domestic experience of civil-military 
interaction would have been radically different. Moreover, the measures and exercises agreed 
through the ACRS process would have required closer domestic cooperation between the 
civil-military structures, as well as the technical experts, and it is interesting to analyze the 
potential impact of ACRS to alter power relations between these domestic institutions. For 
instance, Barry Posen (1984, pp. 56-75) posits that as the probability of armed conflict 
declines, military structures conform more closely to predictions of organizational behavior 
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theory, and also – that growing security concerns prompt increased civilian efforts of 
oversight over the military establishment. Since the ACRS process was intended to gradually 
improve the regional security environment, it is curious to observe whether any of these 
effects on inter-agency relations could be observed as it unfolded. 
Methodological Limitations and Proposed Remedies 
Some of the common critiques of the interview and oral history methodologies stem 
from the nature of verbal and textual information as a credible modicum. Questions surround 
individual’s general ability to accurately convey their inner experiences or events they have 
witnessed through a verbal exchange process of an interview (Hammersley, 2008). The 
primary focus of the interviews was the personal narratives of interviewees, rather than the 
search for absolute historical truths, as is characteristic for phenomenological interviewing 
(Roulston, 2010, pp. 16-29). This was also helpful in addressing the challenge of accuracy 
when discussing the events that occurred some twenty years earlier –a detailed timeline of 
key factual events was maintained for reference purposes, but focused on memories of 
emotions and perceptions, which individuals seemed to have a better recollection of. 
While it was important to avoid giving the interviewees an impression that they are 
being judged and ought to offer a justification for thoughts and actions they describe, the 
second and third layer of group interviews were added in an attempt to qualify these 
individual experiences through a collective history filter. In the second layer of national 
delegation interviews, that had to be weighed against the participants’ level of comfort to 
speak frankly in the presence of their former (or current) superiors and colleagues, especially 
since they experienced these events together, so diverging recollections could suggest direct 
confrontation. The third layer of interviews, with representatives from each delegation 
brought together, presented challenges in depicting divergent perceptions within teams or 
delegations – inviting particular representatives risked validating their narrative in the eyes of 
fellow participants as the discussion moved ahead. 
A subsequent set of concerns relates to the use of language and terminology. Namely, 
the selection of language to conduct the interviews in may influence the interviewee’s speech 
patterns and choice of vocabulary, as well as their interpretation. For this project, all 
interviews were conducted in English – a language all participants were fluent in, but many 
were not native speakers. Similarly, a cautionary note is needed for the terminology used in 
this interdisciplinary research project: different academic fields tended to used different terms 
to refer to the same issue at hand, and vice versa. In addition, the effort to make this project 
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accessible and useful to both, academic and policy practitioner audiences also influenced the 
terminology choices. Nevertheless, it must be noted that all the interviewees were from the 
field of nonproliferation and shared understanding of the discussed terms.  
Finally, the reliability of the interview process could be challenged on the basis of that 
the interviewer, as the medium eliciting and capturing responses, influences responses as the 
information requested is channeled through him or her. While this is a general concern, 
following consultations about the best interview practices with other scholars, each interview 
was conducted in the consistent team of two, with interviewers taking turns in leading the 
question process, and taking notes independently, as well as tape recording the interviews. In 
turn, some interviewees got more reserved when the conversations were taped, choosing their 
words more carefully and noticeably filtering their responses, despite being promised 
anonymity. 
Preliminary Insights from Individual Interviews 
At the time of writing, stage two of collective delegation interviews was in progress, 
and the final joint session was yet to be held, but the first stage of individual interviews, 
together with newly available primary source information, have already produced significant 
preliminary insights, briefly discussed below. 
First, the interviewees shared their insights about the personalities on their national 
teams, as well as regional counterparts, with surprising frankness. With the promise of non-
attribution, elaborate pictures were quickly presented of the characters that played the leading 
roles throughout the ACRS process – whereas discussions of national inter-organizational 
dynamics were slightly more formalized and assessments – more ambiguous. Furthermore, 
the interviewees frequently pointed out the contrasting personalities of the lead Egyptian and 
Israeli negotiators, and, more importantly, their contrarian inter-personal dynamics, as major 
obstacles for building trust.  
Second, testing the theoretical frameworks on trust building proved challenging: it 
turned out that many lead ACRS participants knew each other before the process had started 
from previous interactions in diplomatic forums of New York and Geneva, as well as USA-
Israel Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and brought a certain level of trust (or rather 
distrust) to the table. Indeed, it transpired that previous connections to parties in the region, as 
well as belonging to the small national communities of arms control professionals, were key 
to being selected to the ACRS delegations to begin with. Since the formative stage of these 
inter-personal dynamics had already unfolded, the interviewees recounted few episodes 
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reflective of initial bonding, instead focusing on later stages of trust development. The parties 
recalled naturally gravitating towards the persons they already knew; gradually increasing the 
levels of trust in these relations, whereas previously untrusted and unfamiliar parties 
continued their interactions at an arms-length. Whilst such behavior of seeking comfort in 
familiarity would generally hardly be surprising, the fact that this dynamic unfolded amongst 
highly skilled diplomats, changing little over the course of five years was somewhat 
unexpected and disconcerting. Interestingly, the bottom-up effect of trust building amongst 
lower-level staff being gradually channeled up the chain of command was also hardly 
discernable. 
Third, with regards to cultural aspects, it was not the lack of cultural awareness, but 
rather fundamental political disagreements that made it hard for the parties to connect and 
trust each other. Many recalled substantial initial reservations - to even shake hands, much 
less talk across the divide - which dissipated only marginally as the process unfolded. 
Nevertheless, the cultural and institutional factors surfaced in the different ways that the 
parties tended to (or not to) draw a line between national positions and actions in official 
capacity, and personal interactions. For instance, the negotiators recalled political frustrations 
exploding into personal animosities at times of heightened tension, and some felt cheated 
when a fellow negotiator they felt they were getting to know on a personal level would 
stubbornly stick to a national position counterproductive to the process. Overall, most 
participants expressed a preference for more directness in conduct of their counterparts, even 
when the content to be delivered was inevitably unpleasant. 
Fourth, the interviews revealed that the USA, the leader of the process, came to it with 
very limited objectives, namely, promoting a dialogue between the Arab states and Israel. 
Arms control turned out to be simply one of the issues at hand, largely selected following the 
recent success of the USA-USSR arms control agreement, and shred regional concerns over 
WMD programs revealed in Iraq. There was a marked disconnect between the national 
institutions that set the process in motion during the Madrid Conference and its implementers, 
as well as diverging views – amongst the participants, and between the USA and the regional 
parties, about the objectives of the process. 
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